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
24 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence


FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Problems of
Controlling Allied Troop Groupings



1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. This article explores various problems that may be encountered in controlling groupings which include foreign troops, drawing upon the experience of World War II and postwar exercises. The author cites differences in weapons and equipment and problems of standardizing them or trying to work around these problems. Differences in languages as well as communications equipment and operating procedure slow the passage of needed information and compound control problems. The author recommends using the Latin alphabet for radio traffic rules, using computers for automatic translation and information processing, and providing special training for units designated to enter combined formations. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962.



2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned



William W. Wells



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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

DATE OF INFO. Early 1962

DATE 24 November 1976

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Problems of Controlling Allied Troop Groupings

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. The author of this article is Colonel P. Grabovskiy. This article explores various problems that may be encountered in controlling groupings which include foreign troops, drawing upon the experience of World War II and postwar exercises. The author cites differences in weapons and equipment and problems of standardizing them or trying to work around these problems. Differences in languages as well as communications equipment and operating procedure slow the passage of needed information and compound control problems. The author recommends using the Latin alphabet for radio traffic rules, using computers for automatic translation and information processing, and providing special training for units designated to enter combined formations. End of Summary

Comment:

General-Mayor P. V. Grabovskiy has been identified as a candidate of military sciences who in July 1975 was co-authoring a book on the automation of troop control. He was associated with the Frunze Military Academy in the late 1960's and was chief of the department of command theory in 1971. After 1962 the SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

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Problems of Controlling Allied Troop Groupings

by
Colonel P. Grabovskiy

There are no doubts whatsoever that a future war, if the imperialists succeed in unleashing it, will be a war between two coalition groupings. The socialist countries will constitute a unified military camp in which the soldiers of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries will fight shoulder to shoulder.

The combined actions of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and the German Democratic Republic are most probable in the Western Theater of Military Operations, within whose borders are found the main forces of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries. And one cannot exclude the involvement of other allied armies in this theater.

In the accomplishment of tasks by the combined efforts of the armed forces of various countries, it is inevitable that troop groupings will be established made up of army formations, large units, and units from the various national armies.

We will call allied those operational and tactical scale troop groupings that are under a unified command and have the function of accomplishing tasks by means of the combined efforts of the large units and units of the armies of the various countries. The establishment of such groupings within the framework of a single front or army, and sometimes, as an exception, even of a division, will be a frequent occurrence, in our opinion, in a situation that might arise under conditions of highly mobile actions and, above all, in the initial period of war.

It is known that war may begin by surprise. Our troops will be forced to deliver a powerful attack in order to thwart the enemy's intentions. As a result of the massive employment of missile/nuclear weapons, both sides will suffer heavy losses. Under these conditions, the combat effectiveness of the troops will be determined to a decisive degree by the amount of the losses in forces and in means, by the level of destruction of the movement routes to the lines of commitment, and also by the ability of the control organs at all levels of command to precisely and firmly command the troops.

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The capability of ground forces to immediately initiate combat actions will depend in significant degree on their mobility, on how quickly they will be able to restore the former attack groupings or establish new ones in the required place. Naturally, under these conditions the establishment of allied groupings is most probable, in that there might arise the requirement to reinforce this or that grouping with troops from another country who have retained their combat effectiveness and are in a position to arrive at the required area in the shortest possible time. In this case, there may arise the need to include in the complement of those troops arriving from the interior of the theater those large units and units which by this time have already entered the engagement. It is quite possible that combined-arms (tank) armies located in the territory of another country will have included in their complement large units and units of that country which will have had experience in operating in their own territory or which will have been given the task of providing specific types of support to the allied troops in the assigned area. In the latter case, these will be special troops, in particular air defense, engineer, engineer-road, and other troops who, as they will have had much experience in operating in their own territory, will be able within a short period of time to support the march and maneuvering of allied troops, the negotiation of water obstacles, etc.

The possible putting out of action of a considerable part of the troops of an army will require the commitment in its zone of actions of another country's troops that are approaching from the interior. Furthermore, frequently in these cases, as shown by the experience of the Great Patriotic War and of postwar exercises, foreign large units and units that are in the second echelons and reserves of the front or armies, will be committed.

It should be noted that it will not always be possible or necessary to employ foreign large units and units immediately even on the axes or in the zones of action of their own national armies. Sometimes, even when troops of the given army are available in the second echelons or reserves, it may be necessary to retain them in order to accomplish special tasks arising out of military or political considerations (the inadequate combat effectiveness of the troops of the given country due to losses inflicted on them, their considerable distance away from the area of the commitment to battle, the advisability of incorporating foreign troops into the complement of groupings that have had considerable combat experience, the need for foreign troops for actions in a specific national area, etc.).

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What has been stated allows one to affirm that the combined actions of troops from different countries in the complement of allied groupings will be a very widespread occurrence.

* * * *

The control of allied groupings has characteristic features. In order to define these, let us first of all turn to the experience of the past war.

As is known, during the Great Patriotic War formations, large units, and units of the armies of other countries were activated in the territory of our country and with our help. In so doing, the military contingents of Poland and Czechoslovakia had certain characteristics. The battalions, regiments, brigades, and divisions were organized basically according to the regulations of the Red Army. As concerns corps and armies, they were organized differently.


Equipping the foreign troops with Soviet weapons and equipment, training them according to the combat regulations of the Red Army, having them utilize our army's combat experience, and manning them to a considerable degree with persons who knew the Russian language -- all of this was responsible for the specific features of the command over the above-mentioned contingents.

Above all, it should be noted that all foreign troops were under a unified Soviet command, although certain matters (political, personnel, etc.) were decided upon by the national leadership.

Depending on the number of forces and means, the Polish and Czechoslovak troops operated as part of the Red Army corps, armies, and fronts. Control was exercised over them without supplementary command levels and basically using the methods adopted by our army and in the Russian language. Until the necessary number of large units and units of the special branch arms and of aviation were established, the Polish and Czechoslovak contingents were reinforced with the requisite Red Army units.

Subsequently, the rapid development of the allied armed forces was responsible for making it possible for two combined-arms armies, a tank corps and an air corps, and many large units and units of the special branch arms and of aviation of the Polish Armed Forces, and also a Czechoslovak corps, tank brigade, and composite air division, to participate in the concluding phase of the war in operations together with

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the Red Army.

Characteristically, in the Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian, Berlin, and Prague offensive operations, the combined-arms armies of the Polish Armed Forces were not reinforced (or scarcely reinforced) with large units and units of the branch arms and special troops of the Red Army. The make-up of these armies permitted them to independently fulfil their tasks during the entire front offensive operation. In certain cases mutual resubordination of Soviet and foreign troops took place as a result of the rapid development of events. Thus, in the course of the East Pomeranian operation the 1st Tank Brigade of the Polish Armed Forces' 1st Army, operating as a part of the 1st Belorussian Front, was resubordinated to the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army belonging to the 2nd Belorussian Front. In turn, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front was subordinated to the commander of the Polish Armed Forces' 1st Army.


Analogous examples can also be cited based on the experience of the combined actions of the Red Army troops and the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps.

All of these resubordinations did not present the kind of difficulties in the command of the troops that would have made it necessary to use special methods of control.

The conditions regarding the control of the Romanian and Bulgarian armed forces developed rather differently. The armies of these countries differed from ours in their organization, weapons, equipment, training and educational system, and also in their combat training level. Moreover, there were pronounced language differences, particularly with the Romanian army.

The status of the Romanian and Bulgarian armed forces detailed to participate in the struggle on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition determined the place, role, and methods of employing them in Red Army operations. As is known, the Romanian 5th Combined-Arms Army operated primarily as a part of the 7th Guards or 27th or 53rd Combined-Arms Armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The 4th Romanian Army was subordinate to the command of the 27th or 30th Army and the air corps was part of the air army of this same front. The newly activated 1st Bulgarian Army was part of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and completed its tasks primarily by means of its own forces.*

* Some numbers are uncertain.





To ensure the best command over the groupings made up, for example, of Soviet and Bulgarian troops, a front operations group was established in the Bulgarian army and army (corps) operations groups were set up in its divisions. These groups constituted intermediate links in which the exchange of information* was carried out between levels of command that were significantly different and worked using different languages. With the help of these operations groups reliable mutual understanding was achieved and the cooperation of the troops making up the allied grouping was ensured.


The composition of the operations groups varied (ranging from seven to 20 officers) and depended on the degree of difference between the intersubordinated or cooperating troops. As a rule, the groups included operations officers, officers of the branch arms and special troops, cipher officers, translators, and also communications means and the personnel servicing them.

The different procedures and methods of operating on the battlefield made it necessary for the officers of the operations groups to actively participate in the preparation of the combat actions of the allied troops and in commanding them, especially when the troops were reinforced with types of weapons and technical equipment which they did not possess. Sometimes an operations group had to exercise direct command over the combat actions of allied groupings. For example, the front group of General A. V. Blagodatov, which was with the 1st Bulgarian Army, at the time of the battles on the Drava River (January 1945) successfully exercised command over the combat actions of the 133rd Soviet Rifle Corps and the 4th Bulgarian Corps.

In certain cases operations groups were not established because it was enough to exchange liaison officers or to send to the foreign troops instructors from among the officers who knew the language of the allied army.

The intersubordination of the troops of the different countries during the Great Patriotic War was a widespread occurrence. As a result of research into the principal operations in which troops of our allied countries participated together with Red Army troops, 175 cases were noted in which foreign formations, large units, and units were subordinated to our army and 136 cases in which our troops were subordinated to the foreigners.

* Information is taken to mean any type of messages circulating through the communications channels on various links.



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Under present conditions the very fact of the existence of the armed forces of the countries of the people's democracy and of the Warsaw Pact organization dictates the likelihood of the widespread intersubordination of the troops of the various countries. Thus, just in ten of the combined exercises conducted in the years 1957 through 1961 there were 86 cases of intersubordination, in 40 of which our combined-arms large units operated as a part of foreign armies and corps. The decision on the question of intersubordination was frequently within the jurisdiction of the front level of command and, as an exception, of the army level of command.

The experience of the past war and of postwar exercises reveals that the decision concerning the intersubordination (resubordination) of troops of various countries is made on the basis of the necessity of establishing attack groupings; in so doing one takes into consideration the number of combat-effective troops that remain on the battlefield or that have been committed to the engagement, the capability for reliable control of the allied groupings, and also the capability for comprehensive support of them.

As a rule, it is expedient to subordinate the troops of another country to those formations and large units that retain the initiative, maintain stable control, possess an adequate number of control forces and means, and have experience in commanding allied groupings.

To achieve reliable and flexible command over allied groupings, and to also provide for their comprehensive support, it is necessary to take into account the differences in organization, weapons, technical equipping, and combat preparedness of the armies of the different countries and their language differences. At the critique of a command-staff exercise in August 1958, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, Minister of Defense, pointed out, "Each socialist country has its own combat experience gained in past wars, its own military traditions and distinctive military art characteristics, and its own practices in building and training armed forces under peacetime conditions."

At the present time there are in existence unified tables of organization for the large units and units of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries. However, in view of the fact that the process of developing armed forces proceeds continuously, it will be rather difficult to achieve complete standardization of the large units and units of the armies of several countries. That is why in a future war there may be in the complement of allied groupings troops differing somewhat in their organization and equipping.

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The rapid development in the postwar period of the industry of the countries of the people's democracies has made it possible for certain of them to equip their armies primarily with their own means. It must be remarked that as a result of the inadequate coordination of these efforts, in a number of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries there have appeared and still are available certain kinds of non-Soviet type armament. At the present time, with the overall approval of the participants in the Warsaw Pact organization, standard types of armament are being produced. However, because of the availability of finite reserves of armament, and also due to the fact that the complete re-equipping of the armies with the latest types of armament requires the expenditure of great economic efforts, there are still certain non-standard types in the allied armies. Consequently, should a war occur in the near future it will be necessary to deal with certain facts of the presence of different types of armament in the hands of the troops making up the allied groupings.

There are even greater differences in the technical equipping. This is explained, in addition to the above-indicated reasons, by the different economic capabilities of the countries and, in particular, by the inadvisability of suspending the mass production of certain types of equipment that has been initiated in certain countries. In wartime, the differences in the types of supplies of the troops of the allied countries might even increase. This relates primarily to transport and to other means that would be supplied to the armed forces from the national economy.

The combat effectiveness of the troops of the Warsaw Pact organization at the present time is to a certain degree being equalized, this being fostered by the presence of a common military doctrine, common regulations and a combined Supreme Command, the presence of common principles on the building and training of armed forces, and the standardization of the principal types of armament. One should, however, keep in mind that an identical level of combat and political training of the troops cannot be achieved even within the framework of a single country, not to mention that of a system of several countries, because in the latter case, with other conditions being equal, it is affected by the presence in each army of special characteristic features that are peculiar to it alone, and which are due to the national characteristics of the personnel, the military traditions, the combat experience of the army as a whole and of its command personnel in particular, the level of political consciousness of the people of the given country, etc. That is why in a future war the allied groupings cannot be made up of large units and units that have equivalent combat effectiveness.

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
As before, the language differences will give rise to serious difficulties in the control of allied groupings despite the present widely practiced study of the Russian language in the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries. As shown by experience gained in combined exercises, the level of knowledge of the Russian language on the part of officers of the allied armies at best permits the personal contact of a certain category of generals and officers at the levels of division and higher. That being the case, the conversations in the Russian language over technical communications means give rise to additional difficulties. And the completion of documents in the Russian language demands enormous efforts and the expenditure of large amounts of time by the officers of the fraternal armies. For example, in the combined exercises conducted by one of the armies of the Belorussian Military District in May 1961, the staff of a mechanized division of the Polish Armed Forces required over 20 hours to draft a combat order in the Russian language and three to four hours to write out intelligence reports. Working in the Russian language presents an even greater difficulty to officers of the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Romania, whose native languages do not have a Slavic base.

The above-mentioned differences may have an appreciable effect on the combat capabilities of the troops and consequently on the nature of the tasks accomplished by them. If these are pronounced differences between the large units and units of the different countries, then their tasks will be determined differently. When it is necessary to fulfil tasks that have the same depth and, consequently, to attain equal rates of advance, in case the troops of the other country lack, for example, modern crossing means (as occurred with one of the tank divisions of the Polish Armed Forces in the combined exercises), one must reinforce the allied troops with the required means, and when time is available, also train them.

All of this will have its effect on the process of commanding allied groupings.

In the critique of a command-staff exercise conducted in 1961 with the staffs of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, and of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy pointed out, "At present, commanders and staffs are required to have superior skill in controlling troops, and above all, in the fluidity of combat actions, when they are moving and maneuvering."

In the light of these requirements, it is necessary to picture more clearly the special features of control which inevitably confront



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commanders and their staffs in the process of commanding allied troop groupings.

It is known that the opportune adoption of a decision and the mobility of the command of troops will depend to a large degree on timely information. However, in an allied troop grouping, especially in the fluidity of combat actions, information as a rule will be delayed even more than under ordinary conditions because when troops of different countries are engaged in combined actions, either the number of levels through which information must pass is increased if operations groups with their own means of communications are established in the subordinate or cooperating staffs, or else communications are impeded because of the language differences and the national peculiarities of the station operating service and the radio traffic rules when there are direct communications between staffs that are using their own servicing personnel. This means that the collection, processing, and output of information when allied groupings are operating is a problem that requires specific solution.

The low power of many radio sets and the excessively narrow range of their operating frequencies do not permit one to use diverse radiotechnical means for the purpose of operating on many nets, over long distances, at nighttime, or while moving. In addition, the organization of control is impeded because of the presence in the allied armies of technical means of communications which frequently cannot be coupled due to their different operating frequency ranges or for other technical reasons. To top it off, translation over technical means of communications (and sometimes even in personal contacts) of portions of document texts and of conversations will hinder the attainment of the necessary mutual understanding within a short period of time and delay the exchange of information on the position and status of the troops even more. Calculations have shown that when it is necessary to translate, 30 to 40 percent more time than usual is expended in the collection, processing, and output of information. It is pertinent to note that in this case, only 15 to 22 percent of the time is for creative work and all of the remaining time is spent in coding, transmitting, and translating the information.

Based on an analysis of the salient features set forth, one has every reason to assume that for the reliable control of an allied grouping it is necessary first of all to clearly appreciate the most characteristic differences of its component units. Obviously, it is most advisable to organize the study of the armies of the probable allied groupings ahead of time so as to use peacetime conditions to acquaint the command personnel of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries with the combat experience,

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


military traditions, and the practices of building and training of the armed forces of the allied armies. This applies first of all to the border military districts and groups of forces of the Soviet Army whose large units and units will certainly have to operate in the complement of allied groupings. Such data as the organization of the troops, their weapons, combat equipment, and other equipment, the level of the combat and political training, the specific features of the organization of party-political work, etc., must be available and continuously updated in the staffs of those formations and large units that already have been earmarked for combined actions and also in those which possibly will have to operate in the complement of allied groupings.


Only with a detailed knowledge of the forces and means making up an allied grouping, and this means also a detailed knowledge of their differences, can the commander and the field headquarters of an army as a whole correctly assess the balance of forces, establish the necessary attack groupings, assign feasible tasks to the foreign troops, implement their comprehensive support, and also skilfully control them.

It has already been noted above that in the years of the Great Patriotic War the armed forces of foreign countries had dual subordination. In our opinion, this subordination will hold good even in the future. This arises from the fact that the member countries of the Warsaw Pact cannot decline responsibility for maintaining the combat readiness and high political consciousness and morale of their own troops nor also for the organization of their comprehensive support. Consequently, it is required on the part of the national governments (general staffs) that they monitor the execution of the orders and instructions issued to their own troops and that they coordinate their actions with the authorities which will command the combat actions of the allied groupings. Since the indicated matters may fall within the sphere of influence (at a different time and in different degree) of two command authorities, the foreign formations (large units and units) in the complement of the allied groupings will in many cases be obligated to carry out the orders of both the immediate authority exercising control over the combat actions of the troops and also of their own (national) party, state, and military organs.

In this connection, three problems stand out which affect the process of troop control: the organization of party-political work, the full manning of the national troops with personnel; and the organization of rear services support.



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A number of investigations and the experience of postwar exercises have provided the grounds for the following conclusions.


The party-political work in foreign large units and units, carried out by the national party-political apparatus fulfilling the directives of its own leadership, must be coordinated with the tasks of the troops of the front (army) of the other country in whose complement these large units and units are operating. It must be based on the principles of socialist internationalism, on the standards inherent in all of the armies of the socialist camp, and must be directed towards strengthening the leadership of the armies on the part of the communist and worker's parties, towards consolidating the relations of the army with the people, continuously fortifying the political unity of the soldiers, officers, and generals, raising their activeness in accomplishing the tasks assigned by the party, government, and military command; and towards strengthening the friendship and combat cooperation of the armies of the people's democracies with the Soviet Army and the other armies of the socialist camp. At the same time it is necessary to take into account the historical and national characteristics of the leadership of the party and youth organizations in the allied armies, the differences in the forms and methods of strengthening one-man command, the different military traditions and customs, the national characteristics of the personnel, and also the specific conditions of the situation. In addition, all party-political work requires the integrated utilization of the forces and means available in the allied groupings.

As a result of the study of the historical and national characteristics and the specific conditions of the situation, for each allied grouping one must determine the appropriate system of coordinating the party-political measures which will ensure reliable mutual understanding and efficiency and the improvement of the combat effectiveness of the grouping as a whole and of the large units and units of each country individually.

The conduct of combat actions by allied groupings requires that the rights and duties of the controlling authorities be defined relative to the troop personnel of the other country. This may involve the questions of the assignment or removal from duty of command personnel in cases of urgency and of the commendation or punishment of temporarily subordinated persons, etc. Similarly, when whole subunits and units are put out of action and it is impossible to rapidly shift troops to the battle area from their own country, there should be a statement concerning bringing them up to strength with troop personnel from another country.



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The organization of rear services support will depend on the specific conditions of the situation. In the initial period of war this is affected first of all by the degree of difference in the types of supplies; by the combat strength of the army and of the foreign troops incorporated into it, the number and strength of the rear services units, the materiel reserves and rear services control organs in the army and in the large units (units) of allied troops that are arriving; the nature of the area of combat actions; the availability of local resources, and so forth.

Depending on the capabilities and requirements of the allied troops, their rear services support in combined actions may be implemented either separately -- by way of the national rear services organs, or in combination -- partially through national organs and partially by drawing from the army and front resources of the other country, or solely by way of and by drawing from the army (front) of the other nation.

From all that has been said it is evident that it is necessary to improve the process of controlling allied groupings. To achieve this, one should strive above all to erase the differences between the armies of the allied countries and create the very best conditions for the rapid coordination of the combined actions.

Erasing differences is a prolonged process. It presupposes the unification of the organizational structure of the troops and of the control organs, the standardization of the types of weapons and the technical equipment of the troops, the equalization of the level of the combat training and political training, and the specifying of common methods of controlling troops.

With respect to the establishment of conditions for the rapid coordination of combined actions, for this it is necessary first of all to have a reliable system for the collection, processing, and output of mutual information which is equally accessible to the subordinate or cooperating troops of the various countries.

The reliability of a system of exchanging information depends primarily on three conditions: the capability of linking the technical means of communications, the elimination of the differences in the rules for the station operating service and radio traffic, and the overcoming of the obstacles arising from the language differences.

The top-priority task is that of linking the technical means of communications that are intended for operation at the appropriate command





levels. Its accomplishment has acquired exceptional importance since the increased rates of advance of the troops and their increased maneuverability necessitate a greater number of radiotechnical means that have greater operating range; and also, it is frequently necessary to receive information through several command levels in order to coordinate actions in view of the fluidity of modern engagements.

The extensive practice in combined exercises of using operations groups still remains one of the basic methods ensuring coordination is achieved in the actions of the troops of the different countries. At the present time one observes the tendency to somewhat reduce the personnel of these groups. However, in establishing them it is necessary to select with special care the officers, the personnel servicing the communications means, and the communications means themselves. Moreover, it is necessary to keep in mind that when there are frequent changes in the composition of an army and of adjacent forces, and also of the army troop grouping, it will not always be possible to establish the operations groups and have them shifted around. Therefore, in our opinion, it is more feasible to exchange information over the communications means of the allied troops that are serviced by national personnel. In order to ensure the capability of carrying out this exchange, it is necessary to establish common rules for station operating service and radio traffic for all of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries (or for certain theaters of military operations). These can be Europe-wide rules based on the use of the Latin alphabet. One can recommend the rules adopted in the Soviet Army, but this would make it necessary to appropriately retrain the communications personnel of the armies of the people's democracies. But if Europe-wide rules are adopted, it will be necessary to retrain only the Soviet Army's communications personnel. It is true that they constitute the majority. But because many of them know the Latin alphabet, and furthermore, because the Russian alphabet has nine more characters than the Latin alphabet, perhaps it will be easier for our army to go over to the Europe-wide rules than for the troops from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany to go over to ours.

The adoption of common rules for station operating service and radio traffic will require the coordination of certain elements of these rules. These rules can be drawn on the basis of a creative revision of the instructions that are in existence in the national armies.

The linking of the communications means and the institution of common rules for their operation will provide the capability for an easy establishment of communications by the cooperating and subordinate forces of the different countries. Constant practice by the radio operators of



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the different armies will be the culmination of the process of preparing the communications means for reliable and uninterrupted operation.

Before common rules are introduced for station operating service and radio traffic, it would be desirable to have the staffs of the different countries practice among themselves the joint preparation of radio operating data and the exchange of specialists in telephone-telegraph service and in radio and radio-relay communications. In the course of combined actions, this method, given of course the capability of linking the communications means, will ensure the direct exchange of information among the troops of the different countries. This has been corroborated by troop experience, particularly by the previously mentioned command-staff exercise of one of the armies of the Belorussian Military District. Two Soviet and two Polish divisions operated in the complement of this army. And wherever specialists were exchanged, information was transmitted and received over technical means of communications, although with some distortions. Where this was not done, such an exchange of information was carried out either not at all or scarcely at all.

The achievement of proper coordination demands that the intersubordinate and cooperating staffs operate using the most efficient methods. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, pointed out at the critique of a command-staff exercise in August 1958 that "...the best method, the one that ensures the correct understanding of tasks and the cooperation of the armies, is that of personal contact among the commanders of the fraternal armies operating in the same theater..."

However, for personal contact the help of translators is still required, especially when it is necessary to discuss problems in detail. In these circumstances, the process of coordinating combined actions is always drawn out and occurs at the expense of the time allocated to the troops.

In wartime conditions, it will be even more difficult to achieve mutual understanding than in combined exercises because upon the initiation of war, the armies will be reinforced with cadres who will know foreign languages even more poorly and who will lack proper skills in the use of their own, not just foreign military terminology.

Consequently, there has arisen the need to study in the military educational institutions and in the troops the languages of the countries of the socialist camp. A knowledge of the languages of the allied troops

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is particularly necessary for those persons who will be joining the complement of the operations groups attached to foreign troops, for those fulfilling the functions of axis officers, and for those who will in some form or other ensure the coordination of combined actions.

The study of languages should be carried out first of all among the troops designated to participate in combined actions.

An obvious aid for allied army officers would be the publication of concise dictionaries of common military terminology in which there would also be conventional military abbreviations and common conventional signs.



In the instructions (regulations) on organizing the cooperation of the armies of the socialist camp (if such instructions are prepared), there should be included the obligatory requirement that the commanders and other senior command personnel of the intersubordinated and cooperating formations, large units, units, and subunits, make personal contacts at every opportunity and especially when they first come into subordination or when operating as adjacent forces.

Given the fluidity of modern combat actions, control is exercised primarily through technical means of communication. In so doing, the mutual understanding of troops of the different countries, as has already been noted, becomes considerably difficult. The conduct of conversations via telephone, radio, television with loudspeaker communications, and by telegraph, observing the measures for secure troop control, can be done only by persons who know the other country's language well or by well-trained officers of both armies who have mastered to perfection a procedure table drawn up in both languages. Regrettably, in view of their lack of preparedness for this and the lack of sophisticated secure communications equipment, the troops will most often turn to high-frequency telephone communications equipment, cipher organs, and combat documents.

The practice of employing cipher organs up to now has been such that as a rule, Soviet specialists sent to foreign troops as operations groups are used for this. This approach cannot be the only one, because the troops have no additional cipher organs. Consequently, branches from the cipher organs of the foreign troops will have to be attached to them.

Combat documents cannot be rejected completely, even in the most mobile actions. This is particularly applicable to graphic combat documents which in the near future may be transmitted over almost all technical means of communications. When there is available a common system






of conventional signs and a list of conventional abbreviations, graphic documents will take on an international character, that is, every officer of the allied grouping will be able to read them.


In order to translate the text of documents drawn up in another language, it is necessary to have a large number of translators or groups of axis officers (liaison officers) that know both languages. It is more efficient to use axis officers or liaison officers, as has been corroborated by the experience of the above-mentioned exercises. In this case, it is necessary to have at each control post one or several officers who are able to report on the document received from the foreign troops in the required language immediately or after a preliminary translation.

In the combined actions of armies having a common Slavic-base language and possessing a considerable number of persons that know other languages (for example, Polish, Russian, and Czech), it will suffice to have at each of the control posts one representative of the foreign staff who would be able in the personal contacts to explain the meaning of the unintelligible abbreviations in the documents and who would also advise on the problems of using the unfamiliar equipment which was received as part of the reinforcing forces and means. Besides, when documents are exchanged among troops of different countries, it makes sense not to resort to abbreviations, but to write out all nomenclature in full.

The use of maps issued in different countries can lead to lack of coordination as a consequence of the varied marking of local features. To avoid this, it is expedient to prepare maps with designations in several languages, as was done in the combined exercises of the Far East Military District in 1957. A common Latin alphabet can also be adopted for maps of the Western Theater of Military Operations with the local features marked, not phonetically, but literally. The designations of local features should be shown the way these are given in the countries where they are located.

The development of the means for the mechanization and minor automation of the troop control process requires the linking of the operation of semiautomatic and automatic systems, and in particular, of the electronic computers that are coming into service in the troops of the Warsaw Pact member countries. An added difficulty in the employment of electronic computers in the actions of allied groupings is caused by the necessity of automatically translating both the data received from the foreign troops and also that transmitted to them.





If the automatic sensors of the primary information sources, regardless of their national affiliation, are linked with the communications means and have a common alphabet and a common coding system, then the only remaining problem that will require solution is the output of information to the appropriate control organs in the language required by these organs.

Terminal documentary equipment, such as the telegraph and the tape recorder, and also audio equipment, such as the videotelephone and the telephone, will require automatic translation of the information that is received or transmitted. Only when transmitting graphic information, that is, when using visual equipment such as electronic computer and television screens and also facsimile, will one to a certain degree manage to get along without translations.

The establishment of methods of translation for the needs of the armed forces is a difficult task in that the existing methods do not provide for competent translation of military materials.

In the preparation for automatic translation of Russian, Polish, Czech, and German texts, it makes sense to use an intermediate language, which might be Russian. In this case, a lesser number of translation programs and dictionaries (which by analogy with translation machines for technical subjects can have no more than 1,000 general-purpose words and 1,000 special military terms) will be required.

A future system of control is impossible without electronic computers. Consequently, the present organization and methods of operation of control organs must be a prototype of the future, when these computers will be extensively employed in the exercise of troop control.

Electronic computers must primarily provide for the collection, processing, storage, and output of information. The next stage of their operation must be to perform certain analyses and calculations with the aid of problems in logic. In such an event, the control organs should have a element which duplicates the operation of the electronic computer. This element can be the information and calculation element that ensures, with the help of all reconnaissance forces and means, the acquisition of information concerning one's own and enemy troops, the radiation situation, the weather, the terrain, the status of reserves, etc., and that is also responsible for preparing data used in making the decision and in organizing support of combat actions.





The organization of an external and internal independent system of information communications that is linked with information output equipment will make it possible to eliminate parallelism and duplication in the collection, processing, storage, and output of information and make it easier to introduce electronic computers.

For the purpose of even greater centralization of planning, and also for the direct command of the key means of warfare, simultaneously relieving the commander of the burden of accomplishing secondary tasks, it is necessary to establish a command element. Its functions must include planning and directly commanding the troops, that is, making the decision, assigning the tasks, and leading the troops. The availability of an independent system of command communications will ensure mobile command over troop combat activities and lighten the work of the information and calculation element.

The third element of the control organ is the rear support element. It must bear responsibility for the organization and implementation of materiel, technical, and medical support.

If small groups for the control of the troops are established according to the principle that has been recommended, then when allied groupings are operating it will be necessary to have in the command element and in the information and calculation elements only one or two translators or axis officers in each that know the allies' language.

With the introduction of electronic computers, the translation and transmission of direct orders to the troops from the command element will be carried out through these computers.


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The improvement of the methods of controlling allied groupings involves the study and practical resolution of many problems.

Together with the unification of the structure of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries and the standardization of their weapons and technical equipment, there is a requirement for profound theoretical research and for verification of the results in combined command-staff exercises and troop exercises.

It is possible to speed up the resolution of all difficult questions by an even greater coordination of the scientific research work within the





framework of the Warsaw Pact. It would be desirable if the organ that coordinates this work were able to conduct combined military theory conferences, to issue a scientific and theoretical journal of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries, and to organize mobile exhibitions for the purpose of exchanging experiences and of determining the most effective and economically advantageous types of weapons and technical equipment as well as the most efficient methods, means, and organizational structure for the troop control organs. This coordinating organ must prepare and recommend common rules for the operation of communications means, common terminology, reference dictionaries, standard documents, etc.

The coordination of the scientific research work, the combined troop exercises and command personnel assemblies, the exchange of scientific workers, instructors, and students of the higher military educational institutions, the wider acquaintance of officer personnel with the characteristics of the allied armies, the greater emphasis on the study of the languages of the countries of the people's democracies -- all of this will make it possible, on the one hand, to find the most efficient methods of controlling allied groupings, and on the other hand -- to more thoroughly and purposefully prepare officer personnel to accomplish combat tasks by means of the combined efforts of the troops of the allied countries. At the same time, all of these measures that are carried out based on cooperation and mutual assistance will strengthen even more the fraternal unity of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries.

